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[ JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND AUDIENCE 
IN TIIE DISTRICT COURTS : 
Mihaka v. Police 
"The right of the Judge or other judicial officer 
to regulaLe the proceedings of his Court is an 
essential attribuLe of judicial independence , 
itself one of the cornerstones of our liberty . 
The deni~l of recognition to other than suitably 
qualifjed persons should·not be regarded as 
protection of any privilege or monopoly . " 1 
I INTRODUCTION 
Judicial officers are entrusted with ensuring that the interests 
of justice are served in the conduct of Court proceedings . They 
are to do this by ensuring that all parties appearing before them are 
given the opportunity to present their cases to best advantage . 
Their independent discretion also prevents outside interests from 
influencing judicial proceedings . It enables the efficient 
administration of the Courts and of the judicial process generally . 
Sometimes , however , the exercise of a judicial discretion may 
be seen by a party as unfair. It appears Lo impinge on a perceived 
right. The very existence of the discretion in a particular area 
may be challenged , either on grounds of common Jaw or in terms of 
statute law . 
An example of such a challenge is reported in Mihaka v . Police 2 
It involved the discretion of judicial officers in the District 
Courts to refuse audience to unqualified advocates. Such a refusal 
of recognition can be interpreted as interference with the "right " 
of accused to representation by advocates of their choice . Mr 
Mihaka claimed tha.t he had a statutory right as a "Maori agent " 
t o represent another person and that Justices of the Peace could 
not prevent him from doing so . Attempts to assert th i s right in 
Court led to his arrest and later conviction for disorderly behaviour . 
However he developed his thesis in an appeal to the Hi gh Court . 
LAW Ll~RARY 
VICTORIA UW't'U-;snv Or WHLINGTGN 
-2 . 
Strictly, the claim was irrelevant to tl1e appeal but Hardie 
Boys J. considered it at some length in obiter dicta . He 
concluded that Mr Mihaka had no right of audience as a Maori agent 
but ~hat judicial officers in lower courts do have discretion to 
allow laymen to appear before them as advocates. If the latter 
conclusion is accepted, then the discretion of judges in the lower 
3 courts is greater than some have assumed. 
This paper uses the obiter ~icta from Mihaka v . Police as 
a basis for analysing the limits of judicial discretion as to 
recognition of advocates in the District Courts . The Maori 
agent is considered as a special type of unqualified advocate 
before the position of advocates generally in the District 
Courts is investigated. 
In the next Part of this paper , the judgment of Hardie Boys 
J . is outlined . In Part III , the history of Maori agents is 
i nvestigated and their legal status discussed . Part IV considers 
judicial discretion as it is affected by the rights of represent-
ation and assistance given by common law and statute . Part V 
considers the effect of the Law Practitioners Act 1955 - in 
particular the effect of section 16 which prohibits an unqua l ified 
person from acting "as a solicitor in any Court ". Foreign case 
l aw and policy considerations are discussed and a test is suggested 
for classifying acts in Court which are restricted to lawyers . 
The Conclusion summarises the limitations of judicial discretion 
as to representation in the District Courts under the present law . 
NOTE : (1 ) Statute law is discussed in this paper as i t was 
in 1981 when the report of Mihaka v. Police was published . 
This paper is written in 1982 . There is now before 
Parliament a Law Practitioners Bill which will supersede 
the Law Practitioners Act 1955 when passed into Law . 
Clause 63 of that Bill reorganises the provisions of the 
present section 17 but does not alter their effect .4 
The present sections 14 and 16 are combined in clause 53 , 
so that acting "as a barrister in any Co'..lrt " and acting 
"as a solicitor in any Court" come under the same provision . 
The proposed changes ·do not substantia l ly affect the 
disc'..lssion which follows . 
( 2 ) The legal status of lay advocacy in the District Court is 
discussed in the context of heari~gs of statutory offences 
only . Mr Mihaka claimed rights of audience in such a 
context and it has the greatest implications for the 
judicial system . 
[ II 
[ 
A. 
B . 
3. 
JUDGMF.N1' IN MIJJi\KA v. POLICE 
Introduction 
The judgment of Hardie Boys J. will be swmnarised as 
follows: Facts of the Case; Decision on the Appea l; 
Maoris and the Legal System; Representation and Legal 
Assistance in Court; The Ma ori Agent; Conclusions. 
Mr Mihaka's view of the background to the case is 
described in Appendix 1. 
Facts of the Case 
Mr Te Ringa Mangu Mihaka appealed to the High Court 
from a conviction in the District Court on a charge of 
5 behaving in a disorderly manner in a public place. 
On 27 March 1980 he had accompanied Miss Diane Prince to 
the Number 3 Courtroom of the Wellington District Court. 
Miss Prince was to appear before Justices of the Peace 
for the taking of depositions. When the case was called, 
Mr Mihaka claimed the right to represent Miss Prince as a 
Maori agent. The Justices refused him permission to act 
as an advocate. They read him a memorandum which had been 
prepared by the Chief District Court Judge . Tl1e memorandum 
stated on the authority of Collier v . Hicks
6 
and McKenzie v . 
McKenzie
7 
that no unqualified person has a right to act as 
an advocate before Justices of the Peace without permission. 
It concluded that an unqualified person may act as a "friend" 
-- only giving advice - but that he "should not be permitted 
to address the Court by way of making submissions or asking 
. " 8 questions Mr Mihaka , l1owever , refused to acquiesce 
i n the decision and protested forcefully and loudly. After 
some twenty minutes , during which two supporters in the public 
gallery had to be removed from the Court , he was arrested. 
Although he had repeatedly invited arrest for contempt of 
court
9
, he was charged with disorderly behaviour. Subsequent 
events at the hearing are described in R. v . Prince . lo 
[ 
[ 
[ 
[ 
[ 
[ 
c. 
4. 
After describing the facts, which he pointed out were 
not really in dispute, His Honour considered the conviction 
in their light. He referred to the test for disorderly 
h . 1 · 11 be av1our as derived from the leading case of Melser v. Po ice 
and summarised in O'Connor v. Police. 12 Disorderly behaviour 
is conduct which , considered objectively in the circumstances, 
is likely to cause serious annoyance or disturbance to those 
present. The learned District Court Judge had not stated 
the test he applied to the evidence . However , in His Honour ' s 
opinion there was ample evidence to warrant the conviction . 
His Honour then considered the appellant ' s contention that 
he had a right to represent Miss Prince and could not be 
guilty of disorderly behaviour by asserting that right in good 
faith. He said that the appellant had the right to make his 
submissions to the Justices of the Peace but also a 
corresponding duty to do it with decorum and 'to accept their 
ruling . The appellant ' s failure to perform this duty had 
satisfied the requirements for conviction. 
rights were strictly irrelevant to the appeal. 
Honour considered the claim to be impoLtant. 
Hence his claimed 
However, His 
In viev· of the 
trouble the appellant had taken to develop his thesis, His 
Honour felt that he should deal with it. 
D. Maoris and the Legal System 
Mr Mihaka had restricted his claim to that of a right to 
represent members of his own Maori race in Court. Before 
considering the applicable legal principles , His Honour made 
some general remarks abou t the position of Maoris in the New 
Zealand l egal system . He said that the early colonisers had 
chosen 1\Testminster-style parliamentary democracy and the common 
l aw system because they were the best they knew . Subsequently , 
they had to persuade the Maori .to accept and trust the new 
I' 
·-
institutic,ns u.nd ensure that the trust was justified . The 
present system was not ideu.l . However , increasing under-
standing of the Maori way and the work of lav,yers in various 
assistance u.gencies meant , in His Honour's opinion , that 
Mc:ioris were not disadvantaged in the Courts. 
E. Representation and Assistance in Court 
1. Introduction 
His Honour said that there were three aspects to the 
right of representation and assistance in Court and that 
they were correctly summarised in the memorandum of the 
Chief District Court Judge. 'l'hey were the statutory 
rights , the rights at common law and the rights of a judge 
to regulate proceedings. 
aspects as fo llows : 
Hi s Honour di scussed the three 
2 . The statutory rights 
Section 37 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1 95 7 gave every 
defendant in criminal proceedings in a District Court the 
right to representation by a harrister or solicitor of the 
High Court. 
The appelL:mt based his claim on a provision of the Law 
Practitioners Act 1955. In a subsequent part of th e 
judgment , His Honour said that that Act r egulated the 
conduct and discipline of the profession and n o t the 
13 
conduct of lh e Courts. 
3. The common law rights 
There was a common l aw right , also , to have a qualified 
lega l practitioner as an advocate . Lawyers h ad a right 
of audience which had been es t ablished by u sage . 
In addition there was a common l aw right to have a 
"friend in Court". It was stu.ted by Lord Tenterden C . J. 
. 11 . . } 14 h . h d h in Co ier v. Hiccs tat any person mig t atten t e 
proceedings , take notes and make suggestions and give 
advice . 
F . 
4. The rights of a judge to regula:!=e proceedings 
The rights of a judicial officer to regulate the 
proceedings of his own Court were subject only to the 
requirements of statute and common law. A judge had 
discretion to allow an accused more assistance than the 
1 . 1 . r 15 h d. . aw requires. Fo lowing .0 Toole v. Scott t e iscretion 
should not be exercised only where it was strictly 
necessary. It should be exercised whenever it would help 
the administration of justice. This discretion was 
essential to judicial independence and a refusal to 
recognise an unqualified person was not intended to 
protect a monopoly . It protected the defendant from 
the consequences of unskilled assistance. 
The Maori Agent 
The appellant argued that he could represent Miss Prince 
on the basis of section 17(2) of the Law Practitioners Act 1955 . 
The subsection appealed to was as follows : 
"Every person commits an offence against this 
section who, not being duly enrolled as a solicitor 
under thjs Act, carries on business as a solicj cors ' 
agent , or in any way advertises or holds himself out 
as a solicitors ' agent : 
Provided that it shall not be an offence under ~his 
subsection for a person to carry on business as a 
Maori agent or to advertise or hold himself out as a 
Maori agent." 
His Honour stated that the proviso to subsection 2 did not 
authorise a Maori agent to appear in Court. It merely 
exempted him from the prohibition earlier in the subsection . 
He then considered the meaning of the term "Maori agent " 
which appeared also in section 57 of the Law Practitioners 
Act 1955 but was not defined in any Act . He thought that 
the meaning could be found in the history of Maori land 
legislation and considered the provisions governing the 
operation of the Native Land Court. That Court was from 
the first an inquisitional co·urt . In an 187 3 Act , the judge was 
[ 
[ 
[ 
to proceed "without the intervention of any counsel 
or other agent'016 although the claimants could select 
a "spokesman". An amendment of 1878 provided that tl1e 
judge could allow "counsel or agent" to appear for either 
17 
party. In 1880 the wording was altered so that nobody 
could appear or be assisted "by counsel or agent" without 
18 permission A similar provision was still current as 
section 58 of the Maori Affairs Act 1953. 
His Honour considered it significant that for as long 
as the Maori Land Court had had discretion to allow represent-
ation by counsel , the Court had also had discretion to allow 
representation by an "agent" . He concluded that the Maori 
agent referred to in section 17 of the Law Practitioners Act 
1955 was a person who appeared by permission before the Maori 
Land Court in accordance with section 58 of the Maori Affairs 
Act 1953. Any authority he might have was derived from that 
Act and did not include authority to appear in another court . 
G. Conclusions 
His Honour then sununarised his conclusions . 
(a ) Maoris and Pakehas appear before a District Court 
or the High Court in the same position. They may 
be represented by solicitor or counsel as advccate 
or they may have a friend to assist them but not as 
an advocate unless the Court permits. 
(b) The j'udge or Justice of the Peace has discretion to 
allow more heJ p than the law requir'es but if his 
discretion is exercised properly , his decision may not 
be challenged. 
(c ) The final part of the memorandum from the Chief District 
Court Judge , saying that any friend assisting the litigant 
should not be allowed to make submissions or ask questions 
is no more than general advice . According to His Honour, 
t his part should not be regarded as imposing a limitation 
on the discretion of Justices of the Peace . 
(d ) The Justices of the Peace had exercised their discretion 
properly in this case . 
8. 
III MAORI AGENTS 
A. Introduction 
B . 
In Mihaka v. Police,Mr Mihaka claimed that the Justices 
of the Peace did not have a discretion to refuse him audience . 
He interpreted the proviso to section 17(2) as being a statutory 
limitation of the discretion and giving a right of audience 
to a "Maori agent". Hardie Boys J . rejected this interpretation . 
Mr Mihaka's claim raises questions as to the nature and 
status of the Maori agent. After describing the few statutory 
references to Maori agents , I shall consider some historical 
evidence of different uses of the term . I shall then describe 
t he functions of the Maori agent as presently understood and 
consider the status of such an agent under the Law Practitioners 
Act 1955 and in the District Courts . 
Legislative History 
The phrase "Maori agent" does not currently app8ar 
outside the Law Practitioners Act 1955 . It appeared first 
in the form "Native agent" in section 34 of the Supreme Court 
Act 1882 which provided that if "any solicitor acts in any 
capacity or in any Court for any Native, whether as a Native 
agent or as a solicitor" his charges should be taxable. That 
section was included in the Law Practitioners Act 1908 and in 
subsequent Acts until it appears almost unchanged as section 57 
of the Law Practitioners Act 1955 . 
As Hardie Boys J . pointed out , the section seems to have 
been a response to the case of In re T . R . Cash 19 in 1880 . 
I n that case , a solicitor had pleaded that his actions for a 
Maori client were performed as a Maori agent , not as a 
solicitor , and consequently his bill of costs was not taxable . 
His contention was rejected but the Legislature forestalled 
any similar and subsequent claims. 
-
-
-
-
9. 
The phrase "Nat:ive agent " was a1so used in section 36 
of the Law Practitioners Amendment Act 1935 . That section 
appears , slightly amended, as section 17 of the Law 
Practitioners Act 1955 - the section discussed in the 
present case . The p~oviso appears in the original section 
and does not appear to have been prompted by any case. 
C . Historical Status 
The term "Maori a.ge!1t " (originally "Native agent " ) 
has a long history in New Zealand. It appears to have had 
several connotations during that time . In 1861 , one Gaston 
Charon , "Native Agent and Interpreter ", is shown as being 
one of the "Extra Employ~s in connexion with the Native 
I nsurrection " on the staff of the Native Secretary ' s 
20 
Department . He was Interpreter to the Forces at Otahuhu. 
Presumably he acted as liaison officer and negotiator with 
Maoris as well as interpreter . 
The term may have been applied to the officers who were 
emp l oyed to purchase Maori land for the government . The terrn 
Native Land Purchase Agent is mentioned in correspondence , for 
. 21 
i nstance. Some of these officers were among the 
government representatives who were expected to report on the 
22 
state of the Natives in their dist.rict when requested -
Regular reports from government officers or representatives 
i n Native districts were made between 1~68 and 1 890 . The 
r eports were signed in various styles including Government 
23 
Native Agent and Native Agent. One Resident Magistrate 
d escribed himself as a Native Agent
24 
which suggests that the 
t erm was not associated with land dealings in that context . 
Officers of the Native Department are also described as· 
25 
"Native Commissjoners or Agents " elsewhere . Native Agent 
would seem to have been a fairly common desc r iption of a 
g overnment representative deal~ng with Maori affairs and not 
necessarily an officer of the Land Purchase Branch of the Native 
Department . 
10. 
The term was also applied to a group of people who 
made a bus~ness of dealing in Native land and , in particular , 
appearing in associated proceedings in the Native Land Court. 
When the Hon. Mr Ballance had various meetings with Maoris 
in 1885 , many complaints were made to him about the expense 
26 of having II la1·1yers and agents" in the Native Land Court 
In 1891 , a Commission reporting on Native I.and Law said that 
there had "arisen during the past few years a race of Native 
agents , or Maori lawyers , whose influence generally seems to 
27 
have been pernj cious" . They were "knovm as ' agents ' , 
' conductors' or ' managers' - in Maori , kaiwhakahaere '~ and 
had "established an almost complete control of the Native Land 
. 28 
Court proceedings" . The submissions to the Commission 
contain many complaints about the expense of hiring these 
29 agents and allegations of dishonesty . Native agents were 
subject to no training or control but there was a l icence fee 
30 
of five pounds Unlicensed people were apparently not 
allowed by the Court to act for Maoris . 31 
Some changes were subsequently made . In 1907 a list of 
fifteen people who had that year been granted general licences 
t o appear as agents before the Native Land Court was laid on the 
3·1 
Table of the House of Representatives. - It noted that all 
qualified lawyers could also appean as well as a trustee or a 
person acting on behalf of a relative . Also , special licences 
t o appear in a particular case would be granted on payment of 
a fee . 
The activities of Native agents were probably not restricted 
t o t he Native Land Court . Agents were usually also licensed 
int erpreters . Li censed interpreters had a stat-;;itory monopoly 
on t he translation of any documents involved i n business trans-
. 33 h 1 d. f 1 d 34 1 · h. actions . Te Cyc ope ia o New Zea an ists t irteen 
"Interpreters and Native Agents " amongst the businessmen of 
t he North Island . Most describe themselves as Licensed I nter-
preters only, including one who is listed elsewhere as having a 
3S general licence to appear in the Native Land Court . Four 
36 are also described as Native Agents although onl y one says 
that he is a Licensed Native Agent . Entries have an e l ement 
of advertisement and thus indjcate the nature of the busines~ 
which was carried on . Native agents usually emphasise exper-
L 
[ 
[ 
[ 
• 
ll. 
ience in arranging land deals. Thus Mr Knocks of Otaki 
" takes a prominent part as an interpret.er and native agent in 
Otaki, acting for Europeans and Maoris. He hu.s already had 
a great many transactions touching the sale or lease .of native 
37 
lands" . Two men who did not call themselves Native JI.gents 
38 were obviously also involved extensively in land dealing. 
They would all probably appear in the Native Land Court for 
their clients when it was necessary. 
Thus it would seem that toward the turn of the century , 
Native agent was also a convenient business description 
applying to people who arranged business deals in Maori 
1 and. Qualifications as licensed interpreters enabled them 
to translate the necessary business documents and they could 
appear before the Native Land Court in order to get approval 
for transactions. 
39 o . Present Status 
The term "Maori agent" is one that is familiar to those 
involved with the lmsiness of the Maori Land · Court today . 
They are closely involved with that Court . A Judge of the 
. d h . 40 Maori Lan Court as written : 
"Over the years rr,uch good work has been done in 
the Court by Maori agents and I believe that generally 
their activities have been welcomed by an overburdened 
legal profession . Although they be unqualified in law 
they are expect.ed by the Court to emulate the profession 
in their conduct nnd respect for the Bench and to display 
a reu.sonable degree of maturity" . 
Representation in the Maori Land Court is not necessary . 
Proceedings are conducted with a mi:1imum of forrna.li ty . 
Emphasis is on oral evidence . There is little procedural 
detail and the originating document is an application which 
gives bare details of the claim . Anybody who seeks audience 
. . 41 
is always gr3nted it 
42 
- or almost always. It is fairly 
common for a party to a claim to be represented by a relative 
for instance. No fee is charged . 
[ 
[ 
[ 
[ 
[ 
[ 
[ 
[ 
[ 
• 
[ 
• 
[ 
[ 
r 
I, 
12. 
However, the Maori Land Court makes its decisions 
b d 
. 43 
ase on tlaori custom and it is also the sole 
44 on what shall be recognised as Maori custom . 
authority 
Maori agents 
are hired for tl1eir knowledge of the pru.ctice of the Maori 
Land Court and also as advocates if they nppear before the 
Court. TI1e qualifications for a Maori agent described 
in the early case of In re T.R . Cash (1880) 45 as being 
acquaintance with "Milori customs and language" are still 
applicable. 
Some of the Maori agents who have operated since 1945 
are li sted in Appendix 2 . In the last few decades it seems 
that the great majority of people who have called themselves 
Maori agents have been past employees of the Maori Land Court . 
Most have also been l icensed interpreters . Of the three 
Maori agents interviewed , two had been licensed interpreters 
and clerksof the Court and one had been a deputy registrar. 
Ti1ere do not seem to have been many agents at _any time during 
th e last few decades. There are no licensing requirements . 
People who regularly represent bodies such as Trust Boards 
are a l so commonly called Maori agents . 
Much of the work performed by a modern Maori agent 
resembles that of a law c l erk. A full-time Maori agent 
can spend a l arge part of his time searching Maori land titles . 
Partition schemes are drawn up and genealogies compiled to 
s upport applications for succession orders . Paperwork for 
matters not directly connecled with the land Court , such as tlie 
preparation of trust deeds, would be l eft to a l awyer . 
of owners are also organised so that the presence of a 
quorum is assured and proxy votes are arranged . 
A l ot of work comes from lav,yers whose clients are 
involved in actions in the M~ori Land Court . Contacts 
Meetings 
made while working for the Court would help in thi s respect . 
Most pakeha l awyers prefer to leave such matters to a Maori 
agent if one is available . 
• 
• 
13 . 
Agents may appear jn other hearings associated with 
Maori lc1nd. Thus section 451 of the Maori Affairs Act 
1953 provides that the Court mc1y tax charges made to any 
Maori in connection with proceedings in the Maori Land 
Court, Maori Land Appellate Court or "before Parliament 
or any committee thereof". 
It seems fair to say that a Maori agent is now a 
person (usually a layman) who performs the work of a 
solicitor or law clerk in business connected with Maori 
land and the proceedings of the Maori Land Court. His 
professional interests are restricted to those matters. 
In the past, the term has also been applied to government 
officials and to businessmen arranging deals in Maori 
]and . 
E . Status under the Law Practitioners Act 1955 
Mr Mihaka based his claim to a right of audience on the 
terms of section 17(2) of the Law Practitioners Act 1955 . 
That subsection refers only to solicitors ' agents. The effect 
of the proviso is that Maori agents do not need legal 
qualifications when tl,ey act as solicitors ' agents. 
"Solicitors' agent" has a special meaning in this context. 
It refers to a person who acts as a· solicitor on behalf of 
other solicitors . A business relationship such as agency, 
employment or partnership is involved . For example , the 
d . 1 46 . . . 1 Ju ge in _!?Jack v . S ee treated l t as axion1utic t 1at an 
accountant who had gone into partne!ship with a qualified 
solicitor hc1d contravened an equivalent provision. 
The proviso permits a Maori agent to act on behalf 
of a solicitor . Its inclusion suggests that at least 
some activities of Maori agents can be classified as acting 
as a solicitor on behalf of another solicitor. It follows 
that the same work performed for a lay client would be 
acting as a solicitor . However the proviso does not protect 
• 
• 
" 
• 
t • 
14 . 
an agent actjng as a solicitor even although a large 
part of a Maori agent ' s business would be commissioned 
directly by laymen. Presumably the Legislature intended 
to protect Maori agents who were acting in their legitimate 
sphere of interest, whether on beholf of a lawyer or on 
their own behalf . The resemblance of the terms "J.laori 
agent" and "solicitors ' agent " may have produced the present 
form of the provision. However the protection conferred 
appears inadequate . A specific provision dealing with 
Maori agents seems desirable . 
F. Status in the District Courts 
G. 
Mr Mihaka did not claim to be acting on behalf of a 
solicitor, but directly for Miss Prince . Since he was not 
acting as a solicitors ' agent , he was nut protected by the 
proviso to section 17(2) of the Law Practitioners Act 1955. 
He could come under the provisions of section 17(1), 
fo rbidding acting "as a solicitor" , or section 16 which forbids 
acting "as a solicitor in any Court ". Neither of those 
provisions contains a proviso as to the activities of a 
Maori agent . 47 Mr Mihaka was acting in a District Court . 
That is undoubtedly a Court covered by section 16 of the 
Act. If the Act applied , it did so by way of section 16 
and not by section 17(2) as he claimed . 
Summary 
It i s submitted , with respect, that· although llardie 
Boys J . did not refer to all of the above points , they 
completely justify his conclusion as to the proviso to section 
17(2) of the Law Practitioners Act 1955. The only legal 
activities associated with the Maori agent in the past have been 
in the Maori Land Court . In that Court agents appe<irerl nly 
by permission. In any event , section 17( 2 ) did not apply 
t o Mr Mihaka ' s activities in Court . Hence the proviso to 
section 17(2) cannot be inter~reted as a limitation on the 
[ 
• 
15. 
discretion of a District Court Judge or Justice of the 
Peace to refuse audience to a lay advocate . 
The above conclusion is fortified by an observation 
from the Court of Appenl when it considered an application 
for leave to appeal from the decision in R. . 4B v . Prince. 
Davison C.J . delivered the judgrnent refusing leave to appeal. 
He said that that was not "the appropriate time to deal at 
length with the rights of a Maori agent except to say that, 
whatever they may be, they are limited to activities concerned 
with the Maori Land Court. A Maori agent as such has no 
right of audience in the Hig11 Court " 
119 
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IV OTHER LIMITATIONS ON JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
A. Introduction 
Hardie Boys J . identified three aspects to the 
right to representation and assistance ina District 
Court. These were statutory rights, common law rights 
and the rights of a judicial officer to control his Court.50 
We can treat the first two aspects as possible limitations 
on the third. I shall consider first the discretion in 
common l aw to grant audience to qualified lawyers . I shall 
then consider the position of lay advisers in Court and then 
the statutory rights of representation . 
B. Legal Practitioners in Common Law 
Hardi e Boys J . stated that legal practitioners have, 
in addition to their statutory rights , a right of audience 
'>l in the District Courts which was establ i shed by usage. 
H . h f 11 · . 52 . d . d d ov!ever, in t e case o Co J.er v. llicks , it was cci e 
that Justices of the Peace have complete discretion as to 
who shall appear as advocates before them . That was a 
c ase in which the l awyer had attempted to act as "attorney 
and advocate " before Justices of the Peace who were adjudicating 
upon an in formation for a penal offence . The Justices told 
the lawyer that they did not allow anybody t o appear before 
them in that role. When he insisted , they had him evicted. 
The lawyer a lleged trespass for assaulting and turning him 
out of the police office but the in:formation was dismissed . 
k .d s3 Pare J. sai : 
"In the Superior Courts , by anc ient usage persons 
of a particular class are allowed to practice as 
advocates , and they could not lawfully be prevented; 
but justices of the peace , who are not bound by s uch 
u sage , may exercise their discretion whether they will 
a llow any , or \vhat persons , to ac t as advocates before 
them". 
It wou ld appear that in Common Law, the right of audi ence 
referred to b y lli s Honour does not exist . Any rights of aud-
ience in the lower Courts are conferred by statute . 
] 
] 
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C . McKenzie Advisers 
The English Court of Appeal in McKenzie v . McKenzie 54 
d J . f 1 . . k 55 f . . 1 rew aut 1ori ty rom Co ~er v. Hie s or the princip e 
that if it is requested, a person must be allowed to attend 
a hearing as the friend of either party . He can take 
notes , make quiet suggestions and give advice . 
The McKenzie case involved the hearing of divorce 
proceedings . The husband , although not legally represented , 
took an Australian barrister into Court with him for advice 
and assistance . However the Judge ruled that since the 
l awyer was not qualified to act as a barrister in that Court , 
the husband was not entitled to his assistance . The Court 
of Appeal ruled that the Judge did not have a d i scretion 
to prevent anyone from giving such help . Peop l e acling 
as l ay advisers in Court are now commonly known as "McKenzie 
men " or ".McKenzje advisers ". 
to have accepted the concept . 
The House of Lords appears 
It approved an order for 
costs which included those of a litigant ' s solicitor who 
t d . d . :i6 ace as a McKenzie a viser . 
In t he early nineteen - seventies several organisatjons 
were set up in England which sought to exploit the concept 
57 i n order to fight the legal system . The best-known was 
ca l led "Up Against the Lawyer ''. It was founded in 1973 
and ceased its activities in ] 976 . Apparently not much 
u se of the possibility is now made in the English Courts . 
Qu ite extensive use of the concept has occurred recently 
in New Zealand District Courts , part i cularly in cases arising 
f r om the tour of the South African r ugby team i n 1981 . 58 
However , Sinc l air J . in a recent judgment refused an 
application by two defendants for permission to have McKenzie 
59 advisers attend thejr impending High Court t ria l. He 
approved a comment by the Court of Appeal of New South Wales 
60 t hat the idea was "an abuse of the court ' s procedures " . 
D. 
r 
The McKeniie case was distinguished on its facts . It is not 
clear ~~ether the above judgment will affect the attitude 
of District Court Judge:s and cause them to claim a discretion 
in the matter of McKenzie friends j11 District Courts. The 
New Zealand Court of l\ppeal has not yet ruled on the status 
of lay advisers in our Courts . A fuller account of the 
judgment of Sinclair J. is given in Appendix 3 . 
Statutory Rights of Represeritation 
1. Introduction 
Charges may be heard in a District Court under 
either the Summary Proceedings Act 1 957 or the Crimes 
Act 1 961 . As indicated by Hardie Boys J ., section 37 
of the Sununary Proceedings Act 1 957 makes provision for 
representation in any proceedings under the Act . The 
fir s t two subsections r ead as follows 
"(1) At the hearing of any charge , the informant 
and the defendant may appear personally or by a 
b arrister or a solicitor of the High Court . 
(2) Except as provided in this section or in any 
other enactment , no person other than the informant 
may appear at the hearin9 of any charge and conduct. 
the proceedings against the defendi.lnt. " 
Subsections (3 ) and (4) provide that a constable may 
conduct proceedings on behalf of another constable and an 
officer of a Department of State or locaJ body may appear for a 
fellow-officer . 
The· Crimes l\ct 1961 does not provide for th e represent-
ation of any informant . However , section 354 of that 
Act states that any "person accused of any crime may make 
his full defence thereto by himself or by his counsE:!l ". 
Th e above provisions limit the discretion of a District 
Court Judge in that he cannot deny audience to anybody 
who seeks audience within their t erms . 61 The only 
explicit limitations on representation are those of pros-
ecutors in summu.ry proceedings . The significance of the 
difference between that provision and the statutory 
J 
2. 
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treatment of other situations is not inunediately obvjous . 62 
Summary proceedings 
Hardie Boys J. assumed that the effects on -the 
rights of an accused of section 37 of the Swnrnary 
Proceedings Act 1957 were limited to giving the accused 
a right to counsel. In ~ffect, he assumed that a judge 
could permit someone other than counsel or defendant 
to appear for the defence. Such an assumption can be 
justified by arguing th~t the absence of an express 
limitation , combined with the presence of st1ch a Jimitation 
elsewhere , indicates that other forms of representation 
are to be allowed . 
However , it can be argued with equal plausibility that 
the specified alternatives are the only ones to be permitted 
and that an express limitation is not necessary because 
there are no exceptions to be provided for. On that 
argument, the judge is not permitted to exercise his 
discretion to a llow an unqualified persorr to appear before 
him . 
An argument similar to the second one above was 
considered by the Privy Council on an appeal from Australia 
63 in O ' Toole v. Scott . Tha t was a New South Wales case 
involving a minor traffic offence . The argument centred 
on a provision which stated that "the prosecutor or complain-
ant may himself , or by his counsel or attorney , conduct 
. . 64 his ca.se " and may examine and cross·-examine witnesses. 
The validity of the initial proceedings was challenged 
on the ground that an unqua lified police officer had conducted 
the prosecution on behalf of the informant and that the 
Magistrate did not have the discretion to allow this . 
Alternatively, it was argued that any discretionary power 
should only be exercised in exceptional cases . Both 
argumenls were rejected. 
r 
r 
Their Lordships briefly considered early English 
cases which affirmed the discretion of Justices to grant 
audience. They then considered statutory intervention 
in the area. The provision being considered was very 
similar to a provision of the Sur:unary Jurisdiction Act 
1848 (U . K.) which had been adopted by New South Wales 
in 1850. Tl1eir Lordships said that if the intention of 
the 1848 statute had been to abolish the discretion of the 
magistrates then express words to that effect would have 
been used. The right to be represented by counsel can 
co-exist with a discretion to permit unqualified advocates. 
In addition, it would have been unreasonable in 1848 to 
intend a restriction of unqualified advocates. At that time, 
many people could not have afforded to employ counsel 
but would have been incapable of conducting a case 
themselves. 
Turning to the second submission , their Lordships 
said that there was no statutory limitation of the 
discretion. The discretion "is an element or consequence 
of the inherent right of a judge or magistrate to regulate 
th d .. h' ,, 65 e procoe 1ngs 1n is court . In the passage quoted 
66 
by Hardie Boys J . they said that it could be exercised 
on either general or specific grounds " in order to secure 
or promote convenience and expediticn and efficiency in the 
administration of justice ". 
Relating O ' Toole ' s case to New Zealand law , we find 
t hat ihe Cnglish Act of 1848 was adopted by the New 
Zealand legislature in the Justices of the Peace Act 1858 . 
Although the wording of section 37(1 ) of the Summary 
Proceedings Act 1957 now differs from that of the EDglish 
Act , there is still no explicit limitation of discretion . 
For reasons similar to those given by the Privy Council 
it is suLmitted that section 37 (1 ) does not restrict judicial 
discretion for summary proceedings . 
3. Proceedings on indictment 
The reasoning in O ' Toole does not apply so directly to 
21. 
section 354 of the Crimes Act 1961. That provision derives 
from section 391 of the Criminal Code 1893 and not 
from an English Act. Again in contrast , it applies to 
proceedings which traditionc1lly hu.ve been he]d in the 
High Court. The question arises whether the traditional 
limitations on representation in the High Court should also 
apply in the District Courts for proceedings under the 
Crimes Act 1961. If they do not, then a District Court 
Judge might have discretion to allow an unqualified police 
prosecutor or a lay defence advocate to appear in a jury 
trial . 
Although the powers of District Courts were increased 
when their jurisdiction was extended to some proceedings 
under the Crimei Act 1961, the nature of the Court was 
not affected . It is submitle~ nlbeit tentatively , that the 
discretion granted by com.'non law to a Djstrict Court Judge, 
lies in the Court and is not a function of the type of 
proceedings. Accordingly , it is submitted that the lack 
of any ~<press limitation of discretion in section 354 
of the Crimes Act 1961 means that District Court Judges 
may permit unqualified advocates to appear in tria]s under 
that Act. In practice, however , police prosecutors are 
u nlikely to seek audienc~ and audience is unlj_kely to be 
granted to lay defence advocates. 
E . Summary 
The analysis so far supports th~ conclusion of Hardie 
Boys J . that District Court Judges and Justices of the Peace 
retain full discretion to permit unlicensed advocates to appea:c 
before them . Rights of audience are conferred on qualified 
lawyers by statute but audience is not necessarily denied to 
others. His Honour presented that conclusion as being corr.patible 
with the opinion of the Chief District Court Judge , as expressed 
67 in the last point of the memorandum . It is respectfully 
submitted , nevertheless , that the two are inconsistent since 
the memoranfum did not allow for the exercise of discretion . 
In reaching the result he did , however , His Honour 
said that the Law Practitioners Ac~ 1955 does not affect 
the conduct of the Courts and so was essential l y irrelevant 
to the question . It is submitted , with respect , that 
some provisions of that Act are indeed relevant. Sections 
1 4 and 16 will be investigated . They raise the question 
whether an unqualified advocate must be refused audience 
b ecause he "acts as " a l awyer . 
V LAW PRACTITIONERS ACT 1955 
A. Introduction 
The Law Practitioners Act 1955 does not contain a 
provision which gives law practitioners a right of audience 
before specified courts and tribunals although many similar 
A t d . , . . 68 I h overseas c s o contain sucn provisions . T1us t e Act 
does not limit judicial discretion by conferring any "rights" . 
Hardie Boys J. treated the Law Practitioners Act 1955 
as not affecting judicial discretion at all . He said that 
i t "regulates the conduct and discipline of the profession 
and its dealings with the public . It does not regulate the 
conduct of the Courts or the conduct of the profession in the 
69 
Courts ''. However , it is submitted that in some respects 
the Act regulates both the profession and the Courts . 
Both sections 14 and 16 , for instance , explicitly regulate 
t he conduct of unqualified persons in Court . Under section 14 
no person who is not enrolled as a barrister "shall act as 
a barrister in any Court ". Similarly , under section 16 
no u nenrolled person "shall act as a solicitor in any Court ". 
I t is submitted that the discretion of Judges and Justices of tl1e 
Peace in the District Court is limited accordingly . 'rhey cannot 
a l low unqualified people to "act as " barristers or solicitors 
i n Court. To do so would be to permit the contravention of a 
statute without specific statutory authority . It follows that 
the activiti es of a lay advocate are permissible only if , and 
t o the extent that , they are not the actions of a qualified 
l awyer . 
The Act does not define the actions which should be 
considered either those of a barrister or those of a so l icitor. 
Both "barrister " and "solicitor " are def i ned in terms of 
procedu re only _7o In pracfice , the difference between the 
actions of a barrister in Court and those of a solicitor in 
Court is irrelevant in New Zealand . There are two reasons 
nw uv~A'.{t 
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for saying this. Firstly, the functions of a barrister 
and those of a solicitor are much the same when they act as 
71 
advocates. Secondly , the distinction between barristers 
and solicitors has never been very marked in New Zealand, 
although separate rolls have been kept for the two professions . 
At present, lawyers m~y only practice as barristers or as 
barristers and solicitors. They may not practice as 
solicitors only. After the passage of the Law Practitioners 
Bill , all lawyers will be enrolled as barristers and 
solicitors. Also, actions "as a solicitor in any Court" 
and actions "as a barrister in any Court " are covered by 
the same clause of the Bill . 
In view of this situation, the actions of a lay advocate 
need only be compared with those of a qualified lawyer. 
For reasons of convenience , however, they will be compared 
with the actions of a solicitor in the discussion following. 
Relevant New Zealand authority will be considered first and 
then the appropriate approach to foreign authority . Some 
foreign cases are considered next , in terms of factors which 
h ave been regarded as being relevant to the question. 
relevant policy considerations are discussed . 
B . New Zealand Authority 
The meaning of "acts as a solicitor " in sections 16 
Some 
and 17 (1 ) is not defined by statute. 
from the Common Law . 
It must be determined 
The only New Zealand case on a similar point seems to be 
72 
Mcculloch v . Anderson , where the meaning of the phrase "acts 
as a conveyancer " was in question . An accountant had drawn up 
a tenancy agreement and charged for his services . It was 
submitted that this was not acting "as a conveyancer " under the 
then section 18 of the Law Practitioners Act 1955 . Mr Justice 
Hutchison traced the history of the provision to a conveyancing 
73 
ordinance of 1842 . The phraseology had remained relatively 
u nchanged since then . His Honour considered i t "to be beyond 
c. 
25. 
74 
doubt" tl1at the meaning of the phrase had not changed 
in that time. The Imperial l\ct applying at the time was 
the Stamp Duties l\ct of 1804. It provided that it was not 
an offence for an unqualified person to draw up any "agreement 
not under seal". Hutchison J . decided that since a tenancy 
agreement was not under seal, no offence had been committed . 
Parliament si.gnifjed its disagreement with the learned 
Judge ' s opinion in section 2 of the Law Pr,,cti tioners Amendment 
Act 1962. The Hon. J . R. Hanan , in introducing the bill , 
said t..hat it "clarifies the law as it was believed to be11 • 75 
The amendment substituted a new section stating in detail the 
documents that only qualified lawyers could prepare. 
The fate of the decision of Hutchison J . warns us that old 
and foreign authority must be treated with caution in ci1is 
area. However, foreign case law should still be useful ;s 
illustrating possible approaches for the New Zealand courts. 
It will be considered next. 
Approach to Foreign Authorjty 
Legjslatures may give their Courts some guidance as 
to the range of legal activit..ies which laymen are not to 
perform. The approach of each Court to the problem of 
defining forbidden acts must thus be affected by the wording 
of the relevant statute. It is also influenced by the types 
of activities which are specifically permitted or prohibited 
by other statutes ind by customary practices . These influences 
can differ between similar common law jurisdictions. Overseas 
cases must thus be viewed in their context . 
Many overseas cases deal with non-advocate activities . 
They attempt to define the limits of legal work outside the 
courtroom which is permitted for laymen. Activitjes within 
the courtroom are more cle.arly identified with legal 
practitioners . The closer activities come to being appearances 
l .. 
26. 
in Court , the greater the likelihood of their being 
76 restricted to quc1lified lc1wyers. Various cases 
hc1ve emphasised the unique function of tl1e advocate in 
the common lc1w system and the great responsibility which 
rests on his shoulders. Some caution must be exercised 
if acts in the courtroom c1re .to be classified as not restricted 
to lawyers. Nevertheless, it is not cJear that all of the 
functions that a lawyer may perform when addressing the Court 
are essential parts of his role . They may be incidental 
aspects which can also be performed by laymen . Foreign 
cases can help in formulating a test for classifying 
activities in this way . 
D. Relevant Factors 
1. Introduction 
There is the possibility that a particular action 
is restricted to solici tars by statute or c;omrnon law . 
It is then obvious that an offence has be.en committed 
i f it can be proved that the action was performed . There 
may , however be no specific penalty attached to the 
prohibition. An example of that situation is the English 
) . 77 h 1 case of re l\ins,,·orth. Ex parte T1e Law Socie_1:Y w ere ru es 
re l ating to procedure were broken . 
Analysis of the cases suggests five other factors 
which may be considered relevant in determining whether 
an unqualified advocate "acts as a so l icitor " under section 
16 of the Law Practitioners Act 1955 . These are : 
background ; pretending to be a solicitor ; acting for reward ; 
acting habitually; acting in a wc1y that requires legal 
judgment and training . The relative importance which these 
factors have been given by different Courts will be examined 
for sample cases from the following countries : England ; 
Australia ; Canada ; the United States of America . 
2 . Background 
{a ) England 
The wording of the provision forb i dding laymen from 
27. 
acting as solicitors is given in the section below 
that deals with pretending to be a solicitor. It 
has not changed substantialy since 1843. 
Various cases have emphasised the idea that Jowcr 
courts have discretion to decide who may appear before 
them as advocates, including laymen. For example, in 
78 . d ,_ ld Duncan v. Toms it was rule t1at a lower court cou 
permit an R .S.P.C. A . inspector to examine witnesses 
on behalf of the society. The Privy Council in O 'Toole 
79 v . Scot referred to several other English cases 
which supported judicial discretion in the granting of 
audience. The possibility that a lay advocate might be 
ilegaly acting as a solicitor was not considered in 
O 'Toole' s case, however, and the point has usualy not 
been refe~red to in the cases. 
The point has been raised occasionaly. Police officers 
commonly conduct prosecutions in th(;! Magistrates' Courts 
by permission, on behalf of an officer who is the 
complainant. The lear~ed editor of Cordery on Solicitors 
comments that if such a police prosecutor were t o examine 
a witness "it is not easy to see why" this would not 
80 constitute an offence. There was corrunent in the 
81 case of VerL:rnder v. Eddols a lso. That case invoJ ved 
a layman ~~  had been alowed to appear in the C8unty 
courts as an agent for litigants in minor civil actions. 
Although lay representation in a county court was 
authorised by statute, a judge remarked that the activities 
of the agent might wel have been an offence under another 
82 statute. 
The Lord Chancelor has recently been given power t o 
grant persons in "relevant legal employment" rights 
83 of audience in county courts . It wil be interesting 
t o see how this devel?pment affects future attitudes. 
,-
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(b) 1
. 84 Austra ia 
The terms of relevant statutes vary between the 
states of Australia. However , most are based on 
English origin.::ils and Engljsh case law is applicable . 
Th ' 'l , I 85 'd d e Privy Counci in O Toole v. Scott consi ere 
authority from many of the states when it decided 
that a magistrate had discretion to grant audience 
to lay prosecutors. However, the question that 
such people might be illegally acting as solicitors 
was not raised in that case or in the cases considered. 
The decision of the Victorian Supreme Court in Hubbard 
Association of ScientoJogjsts International v. 
Anderson and Just
86 
considered the point directly. A 
person sought to speak as agent for a company but w.::is 
not permitted to do so by the trial judge because of a 
provision prohibiting persons who were not solicitors 
from doing certain things "as solicitors" . The Full 
Court held that the provision did not apply to a 
person who did not purport to act as a "solicitor " but , 
for example , merely acted as a " spokesman", The provision 
did not "in terms prohibit the granting of audience to 
an u nqualified person irrespective of the circumstances 
87 in which he seeks to be heard ''. Unfortunately , 
the Court did not analyse the elements of "acting as a 
solicitor" which distinguish it from "acting as a 
spokesman " or any other possib]e activity in Court . 
Whether Mr Mihaka would have be·en acting as a " spokesmcm " 
i n their eyes cannot be determined, for instance . The 
l ack of analysis may have been due to the Court ' s 
finally deciding that Mr Tampion should be refused 
permission to appear , anyway . 
(c ) Canada 
The statutes regulating legal activities in Canada 
vary between provinces . Usually , t h e p ractice of law 
or the practising or acting as a barrister or solicitor 
by an unqualified person is forbidden . Al l stat es are 
J 
J 
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29. 
subject to the Federal Criminal Code , however. 
Section 737(2) of tha t Code provides that in a 
court of summary conviction the "prosecutor or 
defenda nt, as tl1e case may be , may examine and 
cross-examine witnesses person :-i lly or by counsel 
or agent". The interpreta tion of the local statutes 
is neces s arily affected by that provision. The 
Courts appear to have chosen to define offences so as 
not to include the representation provided for by the 
Code , rather than treating the Code as providing an 
exemption. 
In addition, trained "professional agents" in Ontario 
are allowed to appear in small claims tribunals 
and family courts. 
, . d f . 88 Tne Unite States o America 
In the U.S.A. , offences equivalent to acting as a 
solicitor when unqualified are labelled unauthorised 
practice . Not all states have laws prohibiting 
unauthorised practice. The statutes in other states 
vary greatly in the detail of their prohibitions . Not 
all Courts take their provisions into account , anyway. 
This situation arises because the Courts in the U. S . A. 
have claimed for themselves the power to control the 
89 
legal activities of laymen . They regard themselves 
as the dominant branch of government in this field and 
may declnre legislation invalid unless it "helps " the 
judiciary . The wording of the statute may thus have 
. . k90 little influence on a Court ' s attitude . In State v . Kir 
a layman had acted as an agent preparing pleadings and 
conducting cases in a Justice Court . The relevant 
statute prohibited unqualified people from practising 
in a Court of record . It was objected that the Justice 
Courts were not Courts of record but the Court said 
that it was the nature of the activity t hat was 
important , not where it had occurred . 
.. 
] 
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It has been said that in the U. S.A. , "unauthorized 
practice as a body of abstract legal concepts is 
undeveloped , sketchy and uncertain 1 ~ 91 Various 
specific tests have been applied by different 
92 
courts but there is disagreement amongthcm 
as to wliich are acceptable and which are not . In 
general , it is assumed that appearance in Court 
constitutes unauthorised practice and the problem 
of definition in~olves activities outside the court-
room . Thus one Court has said that the "practice of 
law (in addition to conduct of litigation in courts 
of record) consists generally , in the rendition of 
1 • ] II 93 h f egal service to anot.1er . . . . However , t e acts 
of particular cases may modify this approach . In 
94 
Peopl~ v. Alexander a law clerk had appeared before 
the CourL to ask for a continuation and had helped 
in the preparation of an order which the trial judge 
had requested. It was held on appeal that the clerk 
had not engaged in the unauthorised practice of law . 
Administrative convenience appears to have been the 
primary consideration . 
3 . Pretending to be a solicitor 
(a ) England 
This has been a significant factor in decisions 
on whether a person has acted as a solicitor in 
England . The equivalent to section 16 of the 
Law Practitioners Act 1955 (N . Z.) is section 20( 1 ) 
of the Solicitors Act 1974 (U. K.) . It staLes that 
"No unqualified person shall - (a ) act as a 
solicitor or as such issue any writ or process 
or commence , prosecute or defend any action , 
suit or proceeding , in h is own name or in the 
n ame of any other person in any court of civi l 
or criminal jurisdiction (b) act as a solicitor 
in any cause or matter , civil or criminal to be 
heard or determined before any Justice or Justices 
or any Commissioners of Her flajesty ' s revenues ." 
The division of paragraph (a ) into t wo branches can 
be said to imply that to "act as a so l icitor " means 
L 
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(b ) 
-· 
-· 
son:ething other than the doing of one of the listed 
actions. Otherwise the second branch of the provision 
would be redundant. Accordingly, acting as a solicitor 
would seem to involve pretending to be a solicitor. 
Such a contention was made concerning a similar provision 
of 1843 in re Sirrm1ons. 95 An unqualified person had 
issued a writ in the name of another . The language 
of the reported judgment is obscure but Grove J appears 
to have accepted that "as a solicitor " means in the 
character of a solicitor
96 
although he rejected counsel ' s 
full argument . 
h f . . k 97 . 1 d Te case o· Dockings v. Vic ery ; re Symons i nvo ve 
the same statute of 1843 . An accountant had jssued 
a writ which appeared to have been issued by a solicitor. 
I t was held that there was not enough evidence to show 
that Symons had put himself forward as actually acting 
as a solicitor. For that reason , the Court would " le:t 
. .. 98 
him off upon payment of costs . 
I t would seem that an element of pretence is required 
by t he English Courts . This is despite the fact that 
t here is a separate offence of wilfully pretending 
b 1
. . 99 
t o ea so icitor . Presumably the phrase "acts 
as a solicitor " has the sai;ne significance in paragraph 
(b ) as it does in paragraph (a ). 
Australia 
The case o:E re Sanderson Fx parle T.he Law Institute 
of VictorialOO involved threats of legal action by a 
d ebt collector . The relevant statute was the English 
10) 
statute of 1843 considered in re Simmons. Cassen J . 
referred to that case and interpreted the judgment of 
Grove J . as saying that professing to be a solicitor is 
sufficient for acting as a solicitor . However , he ruled 
t hat "if a person does a thing usually done by a solicitor , 
and does it in sue~ a way as to l ead to the reasonable 
i nference that he is a solicitor ... then he does act as a 
102 
solicitor " . 
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The same test was suhsequently used in a very 
103 
similar Victorian case. It was also referred 
. 1 1 104 . h. h to in a New Sout 1 \\lrJ. es case in w ic a company 
secretary prepared particulars of claim in the name 
of an ex-employe l? c:rnd presented them to the court 
registrar. He was held to have done something 
ordinarily done by a solicitor in the name of an 
allegedly qualified person. 
(c) Cc:mada 
In some cases, pretence of being a solicitor has been 
an important factor in determining whether an offence 
has been committed . A company official in Saskatchewan 
who issued a writ of summons on behalf of his compu.ny 
was held to have committed contempt of court by holding 
105 
himself out as a solicitor In the case of Barreau 
d . . . . 106 11 . e Trois-Rivieres v. Kinraeco Ltce , a co ectJ.on 
agency sent out a final notice which said that if the 
debt were not paid within a week , the claim would be 
placed in the hands of advocates. rhe Court held that 
this usurped the functions of an advocate and constituted 
an unlawful practice of law . 
A person who appeared regularly for people in the summ-
ary criminal courts was ruled lo have held himself out 
as a lawyer although he had specifically told his clients 
107 that he was not a lawyer . The fact that he had 
offered his services and conducted himself in the same 
manner as a lawyer was sufficient. 
(d) The United States of America 
The element of pretence is not a necessary one but 
activities which would otherwise be permissible may be 
labelled as unauthorised practice if given the appearance 
of professional authority . Thus in Crawford v . State 
f ] 'f .108 Baro Ca .i ornia , . a disbarred lawyer had acted 
independently "both in regard to matters involving 
advice and to matters that can be characterised as such 
109 because performed in a law office ·' . 
] 
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4 . Acting for reward 
(a) England 
The acting for reward has also been a significant 
factor in English decisions. In Be Ha] 1; E>: partc 
h . llO h' d Te Incorporated Law Society , an arc itect an 
surveyor had entered a personal appearance to an action 
on behalf of a client and had charged a fee for doing so. 
Although any layman could legu.lly have performed the 
law-related part of his services, he was held to have 
acted as a solicitor. 
The case of Verlander v. Eddolls
111 
involved an "agent.." 
ll2 who , under a provision of a statute , was allowed to 
assist parties with cases before a County Court and , 
with permission , to represent ~1em in Court . The 
question before the Court was whether a provision for-
bidding the recovery of fees by Court action applied 
to all of an agent ' s charges. Grove J . commented 
t hat he thought the agent might have acted as an attorney 
or solicitor under the Solicitors Act 1843 (U . K. ) 
d . h h ll 3 . 1 h espite i... 2 ot er statute. It is not c ear tat 
he thought the fee was the significant element , but 
it seems likely. 
The fact that the accountant in Deckings v . Vickery; 
ll 4 d · . f f h. . Re Symons id not receive any ee -or is action 
may have contributed to the Court ' s lenient attitude 
towards him. 
Where a statute has required an expectation of reward 
as an element of an offence , English Courts have been 
satisfied with indirect rewards. Thus in Pacey v. 
k · 
115 d b 11 ,. d f At inson a et co. ector w110 prepare statements o 
claim and attended in Court was held to have acted in 
e)..pectation of ''fee·, gain or reward " because of his 
u sual expectation of commissions. Similarly , t he Court of 
Appeal decided that where a person had done conveyancing 
work for members of an association , with all fees going 
t o other members , he had still performed his work for a 
]1(, 
fee . 
34. 
{b) Australia 
The absence of a fee was held to be decisive by the 
117 
Court in Andrews v. Wilson. A debt collecting 
agency had acted for another in a Local Court for the 
recovery of a small debt. The agency was held not 
to have committed an offence because no fee 1·1as 
charged apart from its usual commission . 
h 118 . In t e cases of re Sanderson and Law Society of N. S . \\' . 
119 
v . Newlands , sums 11ere mentioned as being fees. 
The judges in those cases treated suc:h mentions as 
tending to give the impression of communicab ons from 
qualified solicitors. A fee seemed to be neither a 
necessary nor an aggravating factor in the offence . 
vthere reward or gain has been a necessary part of an 
offence , some Australian Courts have not been so ready 
t o include indirect benefits as those in other juris-
dictions have been. In Barristers ' Board of Western ---
. . 120 . h h d Austral1.a v . Opie a public accountant w o a 
i ncorporated several companies was appointed a salaried 
officeholder in each but it was held that he had 
f . f . Re C 1 121 no t per armed h i s work or remuneration. In ___ r_C!:'!_ c~ 
t he manager of a l ife assurance society wl10 prepared a 
mortgage discharge did not.commit an offence because 
- t he fee went to the Society ' s funds . 
J 
• ] 
... 
( c ) Cana.da 
The charging o f a fee for a l egal service has not always 
been regarded as establishing an offence in Canada . 
( · h) J 22 h d f f I n R Smit v . Ott a.n accountant c arge a ee or 
i ncorporating a society . He was held by the Ontario 
Court of Appeal not to have acted or practised as a 
solicitor because anyone over 21 migh t incorporate a 
society in Ottawa . 
1·23 
In R. v . Nicholson , the Alberta Court of Appea l 
h e]d that a law student who incorporated companies 
f or t he public u sing standard forms had not practised 
l aw although he had made i t a business and adverti sed 
1 
1 
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his services. 
(d) The United State~ of Ameri.ca 
Payment is not regarded as a necessary element: "The 
character of the service and its relation to the public 
interest, determines its classification - not whether 
124 compensation be charged therefor". In State v . 
. 125 
Kirk the agent charged no fees in some cases but 
_this was held to be irrelevant. In Delaware State Bar 
126 Assn. v. Alexander , the defendant was director of two 
divorce reform groups and sometimes asked clients to 
take out membership but no otl1er po.yment is mentioned. 
The Court did not seem to regard remuneration as 
important. Similarly , it did not matter that the law 
127 clerk in Clements v. State received a salary , rather 
than fees.· 
5 . Acting habitually 
(a) England and Australia 
English Courts seem to have regarded a single 
incident as constituting unlawful action as a 
. . 128 . 129 solicitor. The cases of Re Hall , Dockings v. Vickery 
and Re Ainsworth
130 
all involved a single transaction. 
Repetition would presumably be an aggravating factor 
rather than a necessary one . 
Australian Courts have taken a similar attitude . In 
131 Law Society of New South Wales v . Newlands , for 
instance , the company secretary prepared only the one 
set of papers but was convicted. 
(b ) Canada 
Repeated conduct has been regarded as essential for an 
offence by some Canadian Courts . In the case of R. v . 
Campbell and Upper-Canada Business Administrators Ltd~
32 
an Ontario Court required "a frequent , customary or 
habitual course of conduct '' involving legal proceedings , 
advice or drafting , .before peopl€ could be said to have 
t d 1 . . t I ( . 1 ) Ott133 , . 1 d ace as so ici ors . n R Sm1t  v . an iso ate 
i ncident was held by the Ontario Court of Appeal to not 
satisfy the requirements for acting as a solicitor . 
J 
• 
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(c ) The United States of America 
Repetition h,s been taken into account by some Courts. 
One of the conclusions by tlie Special Master who 
reported to the Court in Delaware State Bar Assn . v. 
l34 
Alexander was that for various reasons the activities 
could not "be excused us mere isolated incidents of 
. , . ,, 135 assistance to a person needjng legul aovice . 
The Court does not con~ent on this statement. On the 
136 other hund , the law clerk in People v. Alexa1":_~'-'r 
appeared before the Court in the course of only one 
case but that appears to have been sufficient for the 
trial judge who convicled him of unauthorised practice . 
6. Acting in a wuy that requires legal judgment and training 
(u ) England and Australia 
English Courls have not regarded legal expertise as 
being required before actions are made as a solicitor . 
The archjlcct's actions in Re Hall 1 37 , for instance , 
could have been performed by any layman. However , the 
straightforward nature of the transaction was regarded 
as merely a factor in mitigation . Much the same could 
be said of other cases involving the filing o::: documents . 
Of course , cases that did require legal skills would be 
regarded as particularly serious . 
Similar altiludes have been shown by Australian Courts . 
(b ) Canada 
The legal jud9ment and skill involved in an activity 
has not always been regarded as important. by Canadian 
Courts , especially ~l1ere there is an element of pretending 
to be a solicitor . Thus in Barreau de Trois-Rivieres v . 
Kinrueco Llee
138
, the sending of a letter threatening 
legal proceedings cannot be said to have required legal 
training but the debt collection agency was convicted. 
Such requirements have been considered necessary in 
139 . several cases , however . In R. v . Ballett an Ontario 
.... 
Magistrate considered that legal advice should be 
given before a company is incorporated. In convicting 
a defendant who incorporated several companies, he said 
it was unnecessary to prove that such advice was 
actually given. The case of R(Smith) v . Mitchel1
140 
involved a real estate agent who dealt with real 
estate transactions as if he were a solicitor. It was 
said there that practising as a solicitor involved 
every servjce that imperatively required the exercise 
of the skill and learnjng of a solicitor. Similarly , 
. . h l 141 i n R . v . Nie o son , the Alberta Court of Appeal said 
that the test for practising as a solicitor was whether 
the action should only be done by qualifieG lawyers 
in order to protect the public . 
(c ) The United States of America 
This factor is one that the Courts commonly state 
i s the basis of their judgment , e.g. "The practice 
of law ... is engaged in whenever and wherever legal 
142 knowJedge , training, skill and ability are rcquireo ' . 
Fairly straightforward activities have , however , 
been classified as requiring legal expertise. 
Thus , a debt collection agency that had debts assigned 
to it and then sued on them through a licensed attorney 
was held to have practised law .
143 
The Court objected 
to various aspects of the activj ty but in particular 
the agency had usurped the lawyer ' s position in advising 
the creditor that a. suit was appropriate . Nevertheless , 
it would apparently have been acceptable if such advice 
had been given and the attorney had been hired 
directly by the creditor . 
In general , it seems that any personalised advice 
touching legal matters may be regarded as the practice 
of law. Choosing a form and helping a person fill 
l. t . . . . bl f 1 f · 144 in is not perm1ss1 e or a ayman , or instance 
] 
] 
- ..... _jo. 
7. Summar~ 
The cases considered above are samples only . They 
serve to illustrate the different factors that Courts 
may take into account in determining whether activities 
are to be restricted to qualified lawyers. 
Courts in all jurisdic~ions would seem to regard a need 
for legal judgment and training as being a very important 
factor. Sor1e Canadian Courts have regarded it as a pre-
requisite for an offence. The interpretation in pracLice 
of such a Lest is very important, since it can be extended 
to cover a wide variety of activities . Pretending to be a 
solicitor is also frowned upon in all jurisdictions. However, 
it is often made a separate offence by legislatures. The 
emphasis pli1ced on it in Eng] ish Courts might be an historical 
accident of drafting. Different attitudes have been taken 
towards the payment for law-related services. Some Courts 
h ave ruled that payment does not alter the legality of 
otherwise permissible activities but othe;Ls have ruled that 
it does . Only Canadian Courts seem to have required 
repetitive or habituc1l actions before an offence i s committed. 
The different factors are present to varying degrees 
in different types of lay representation. There can be 
said to be a spectrum of lay advocacy . At one extreme might 
lie pleading in mitigation by an unpaid relative or friend 
of the accused. At another extreme would be the activities 
of a full-time police prosecutor. The CourLs must decide 
whereabouts on that spectrum lies the boundary between activitics 
which are restricted to lawyers and those which are not . 
A Canadian Court , for instance , with its experience 
of having lay defenders at summary hearings , would probably 
have drawn the line so that Mr Mihaka would not be considered 
to h ave c1cted as a lawyer: With the lack of statutory 
constra int s on New Zealand Courts , there seems to be no a 
priori reason why they should not follow the Canadian example , 
even if the legislative background is different in New Zealand. 
1:. 
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J . C . d . 145 Po Jcy on,1 erations 
1 . Introduction 
Courts in New Zealand lack statutory guidance in the 
formulation of a test for acting as a solicitor. The 
relevant case law is not binding or strongly persuasive. 
Policy fdctors must play a major role in the approach to the 
question . The following discussion does not pretend to 
exhaust the issues raised by the possibility of lay advocacy . 
However , I shall try to illustrate the types of issue which 
must be considered . Policy will be considered under 
the following headings: Lawyers' professional interests; 
Availability of representation; Quality of representation; 
Quality of representation; Administrative interests . 
2 . Lawyers ' professional interests 
As has been said , lawyers "arc proud to belong to 
' an ancient and learned profession'. Yet the lawyer 
is in business to make a profit and a legal practice is 
·. ,, 146 
little different from any other smalJ business There 
is a tension between the lawyer ' s role in producing practical 
" justice II for all the members of societ.y and his interests 
as a businessman selling his skills. Hardie Boys J. in 
Mihaka v . Police said that the denial of a right of audience 
to unqualified people ''should not be regarded as protection 
,. 147 
of any privilege or monopoly. The fact remains that 
such denial , if routine, does indeed protect a monopoJy . 
Practisin~ lawyers submit to the control of an 
organising body which lays down requirements , enforced by 
statute , of qualifications and a code of conduct for mcmbers·. 148 
They are forbidden to employ various conunon conunercial 
practices . They cannot advertise , go out and solicit custom , 
diversify into law-related fields or set up limited liability 
companies . Their personal conduct and business accounts are 
subject to scrutiny by the Law Society. They must charge 
prescribed fees for particular services and they may not 
refuse a request for representation by a person who is willing 
to pay the fees . 
] 
] 
In return, reguJation of coMpctition from unqualified 
practitioners is provjded by statute. The regulation 
149 in a particular field could take two forms: 
i) complete monopoly: a total b.:rn on non-certified 
persons doing prescribed work. For example , only 
pharmacists can legally dispense certain classes 
of drugs. 
ii) partial monopoly: a ban on non-certified persons 
holdjng themselves out as practitioners in a prescribed 
field. It may be coupled with a ban on the charging 
of fees by a layMan. For example, a layman can 
legally provide various medical services but he cannot 
advertise himself as a "doctor". 
If District Court Judges and Justices of the Peace have 
discretion to grant audience to unqualified advocates , 
then tl1e monopoly of the legal profession in the District 
Courts is only partial. In that case, competition would 
still be controlled by the exercise of the Court's 
discretion , of course . The effects of lay competition 
on the professional interests of lawyers must be considered. 
Commercial competition with la•.,·yers is obviously possible 
if lay "agents" are allowed to .....-ork for reward. This has 
been demonstrated in , for example , the Maori Land Court by 
the Maori agent , in the English county courts by the case 
of Verlander v. Eddolls
150 
and 'in the Canadian summary courts 
by the case of R . v . Hoods . 151 Competi tars would not be 
restricted by the code of ethics imposed on lawyers . For 
instance , they would be able to use business practices 
which are forbidden to lawyers .. However , the legal 
profession is unlikely to suffer greatly in purely financjal 
terms from lay competition in the District Courts . Work 
in those courts is largely unprofitable. It is regarded 
by many firms as a public service to be subsidised by profits 
from work in other areas. 
Nevertheless , other professional interests are at stake. 
Advocacy is the activity which is traditionally regarded as 
the essence of a lawyer ' s profession . It links him most 
] 
] 
3 . 
closeJy with ideas of justice for the individual. Lay 
competition, combined with the great.er financial and 
professio11ul rewards availabJ e in the superior courts , 
might cause a complete withdrawal of qualified lawyers 
from work in the lower courts. That could well create 
an image of an elitist profession. Lawyers would be seen 
as only being interested in defending the rights of people 
who can afford high fees . Poor people must make do w.i. th 
less competent advocates . 
Lawyers could also be concerned at the effects which 
lay advocates might have on the image of the justice system 
and thus indirectly on the image of lawyers . Business 
practices such as advertising which are forbidden to lawyers 
could reflect cin the ideals of the system . It would be 
an unedifying spectacle , for instance , to see open compet-
ition between businessmen offering rival br2mds of " justice " 
to the public . 
If a system of trained Jay advocates were instituted , 
then the profession could be concerned at the diversion of 
r esources from the training of lawyers and perhaps a lowering 
of standurds. The lengthy and expensive training that lawyers 
r eceive is designed to produce a grctsp of the law as an 
integrated whole . The expense· is justified on the grounds 
that lawyers with such a grasp provide a better quality of 
service . Specialised laymen would not have this overall view 
of the law but their training would require resources that 
might otherwise have been used for training lawyers . 
Availability of representation 
The service that lawyers provide in the courts has 
152 been criticised on various grounds . Some critics 
object to the whole structure of the Court system and see 
l awyers as a powerful group with a vested interest in 
preserving the status quo. Many others , however , criticise 
l awyers for not performing adequately their assigned role 
I 
] 
J 
] 
within the system. The latter group can point to 
large sections of society whose legal needs are not being 
153 
met . 
In genera] , the organisation of the legal system is 
based on the assumption that people in need of legal 
services will seek them out . However, many people who 
ap.J?ear in the District Courts do not know how to obtain 
l egal representation even if they are aware of its avail-
ability and desirability. Most legal firms do not provide 
a service which is readily available to such people . They 
are concentrated in inner-city areas where more profitable 
work is likely to be forthcoming . The position and hours 
of their offices are likely to be inconvenient for working 
people . In addition , legal offices are regarded as 
i ntimidating places by the diffident and unsophisticated, 
even if their location is known. The above problems are 
accentuated for members of racial minorities who have language 
problems. They are not likely to know how to contact a 
l awyer who can speak their language . 
The duty solicitor scheme is intended to remedy many 
of the above defects . It provides representation for milny 
people who would otherwise lack it . But few lawyers appear 
regularly in the District Cour~except as part of the scheme . 
The present system is hard-pressed to produce an adequate 
service . Lay advocacy could well relieve the pressure 
on the qualified lawyers . It could. tdke various forms . 
I t might consist , for instance , of a plea in mitiga t ion 
by a relative , friend or employer . Speeches in mitigation 
after an accused has p l eaded guilty require no legal expertise 
and yet they make up much of a lawyer ' s work i n the District 
Courts . Many lawyers do not know much about their clients 
- the duty solicitors , in particular , do not h ave the time 
t o form a picture of an accused . I t would seem sensible 
to l eave such work to some~ody who knows the person . 
J 
] 
] 
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43. 
Submissions to the Royal Commission on the Courts 
suggested that such laymen be allowed to address the Court 
before a decision is made. For instance, it was said that they 
should be cill0\·1cd "to speak as to matters re] evant , but not 
necessarily material to a finding ••. 154 It was pointed out 
that rules of evidence which .might prevent such addresses 
are not really relevant \,·hen there are no laymen to be 
influenced. 
There seems to be no reason in principle why lay people 
making pleas in mitigation should not be paid fort.heir 
services. In a flight of fancy , a class of professional 
"apologists " can be envisaged whose services would be availabJe 
f or a fee to all accused who pleaded guilty. Alternatively , 
social workers could provide a similar service without a fee. 
Tueither case , a solicitor would conduct the preliminary inter-
v i ew with an accused and advise him as to his plea. If the 
accused decided to plead guiJty , he would be referred to an 
apologist and otherwise to a lawyer. 
It has been suggested that laymen might be specially 
t rained as "criminal advocates " to make appearances in the lower 
155 
courts. Such people would perform all the advocacy functions 
of lawyers. They would provide an aJternative and 
specialised source of trained representation and would 
presumably be more readily available than lawyers who didnot 
specialise in the same way. 
Standard of representation 
Many of the objections to the idea of lay r.epresentation 
are based on the assumption that lay advocates will provide 
an inferior service . The adversary trial process relies 
on the competent exposition of opposing views to test the 
validity of each party ' s case . If the advocate for one pQrty 
fails to assert valid claims ·or objections , then the rights of a 
litigant may be irreversibly prejudiced . As Hardie Boys J . said , 
J 
] 
] 
] 
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"an unqualified and inexperienced person may do more; 
harm than good to the person he assists: if only because 
of his ignorance of the law which may support that person's 
t56 cause.' 
Suell harm cc1n occur under the present system when unl.roined 
d f d d h . · 11. dl57 e en ants con uct t eir own cases . Daemar v . Gi. ian 
is an exar:ip]e of a case where a layman's inabi]ity to cross-
examine effectively was fatal to his case. Judges usually 
give defendants who conduct their own cases as much help as 
is consistent wil.h tl1e appearance of importiality. However , 
a layman who presumes to conduct the case on behalf of another 
would have to be treated on the some footing as opposing 
counsel . 
Canada has not been deterred by such arguments ond hos 
allowed lay representation in its summary courts without 
apparent ill-effect. The record shows that untrained laymen 
under pressure of circwnstances may deal very effecU veJ y with 
the law and procedure of even the superior courts. For instance, 
. . d . 15s . . h in Rei v . Reid one party took his case in person tote 
Privy Council. With training and experience , laymen have 
produced very effective service in various courl.s and tribunals 
on a regular basis . Thus , police prosecutors have had l.he 
statutory right to appear before the lower courts in New Zealand 
for many years. In England , legal executives have been given 
t he right to appear in county cou~ts in limited circumstances 
h · h 1 · . . 159 . w ic seem ikely to be widened in the future. I n Ontario , 
trained "professional agents " are allowed to oppear in small 
c l aims courts and family courts . · Administral.ive tribunals 
i n many countries , including New Zealand , allow lay represent-
ation before them . For instance , specialised lay advocates 
have proved extremel y competen t in industrial matters . 
Lay representation in tribunals can be jusl.ified on the 
grounds that procedure is usually fairly simple and the area 
of law involved is limited to the particular interest of the 
tribunaJ. .
160 
However , the District Courts deal with the 
I 
] 
J 
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very wide field of criminal law. The effects of a 
mistake on a client's interests may also be very serious. 
Nevertheless, it has been suggested that laymen with 
appropriate training can provide a cheap and effective 
161 service as "criminal advocates" in the lower courts. 
One advantage of such a specialised group of parc1-
professionc1ls would be that members would continue 
practising in the lower courts c1nd their clients would 
benefit from ci1eir advocc1tes 1 increasing experience. In 
contrast, lawyers tend to drift away to more lucr~tive 
and prestigious activities as they gain seniority and 
experience. A controlling body could be set up to set 
standards of conduct and ethics for its members in the same 
way that lawyers are controlled by the Law Society . 
5 . Administrative interests 
Both judges and lawyers arc interested in the efficient 
administration of the Court system as it affects their work 
loads and the tax payers are concerned that there should be 
a minimum of waste . Lay advocates may disrupt the judicial 
process bec.::rnse of their inexperience and ignorance of 
procedure and are regarded as undesirable for this reason 
also. The argument would not apply to trained para -
professionals , cf course , but if carried to its logical 
conclusion would require that .no layman be allowed to appear 
without a trained advocate . 'rhat would conflict with what 
has traditionally been regarded as the "right" of an accused 
t o present his own case if he wishes to do so. 
Judges are especially likely to restrict defendants ' 
"rights " which they consider are being deliberately exploited 
t o disrupt proceedings . Thus , Speight J. said recently 
that people who appealed to the High Court from a District 
Court and wished to appear in person would in future have tc 
file memoranda as counsel did: "Tha t will be the policy 
in the future with al l the judges of this Court because we 
are not going to be used as sounding boards for 
. l . ., 162 irre evancies , The effect of this policy is that most 
] 
] 
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defc,~ants wishing to appeal will need to consult a 
lawyer. However that aspect does not seem to have been 
mentioned. 
A similar attitude was taken by Sinclair J. when he 
declined an application by two accused to have r.lcKenzie 
f . d t . h . 1 163 h d b th ht ricn s a a Big Court tria . It a cen oug 
h b 
. . . 164 on t e asis of the English case of McKenzie v. McKenzie 
that there was a common 1aw right to have lay advisers in the 
High Court. However His Honour noted with approval some 
comments from a New South Wales court that the practice 
was regarded there as an abuse of the court ' s procedures 
b h f ' d 11 ub · 1 • · , II 165 ecause t e rien was nots Ject to contra or criticism . 
His Honour said that those comments "are very apt to the 
166 past experiences of the Courts in this country" . 
His Honour did not specify what these past experiences were. 
The past experiences of the Courts may well justify 
t he above attitudes in particular cases. However , the result 
is that the opportunities of defendants to appear in Court 
other than by a qualified lawyer have been significantly 
r educed . The unfortunate impression may be given that legal 
"rights " in Court are theoretical rather than practical . 
I f their exercise proves inconvenient for the Court , they 
will be limited or eliminated. Such an impression could 
be ultimately more detrimental to public respect for the 
Courts than disruption caused by particular individuals . 
There are strong arguments for.increased lay participation 
167 
in the legal system . In particular , there is a need 
for public involvement in order to maintain public confidence 
in the Courts. The involvement of laymen in the system would 
enable the public to see that the law operates fairly and 
increase the understanding of its action and importance . 
Devices such as McKenzie advisers may be desirable for giving 
people the feeling that they have some control over their own 
168 fate rather tlian being hel·pless pawns in the hands of others. 
It is submitted that considerations such as these should be 
balanced carefully with the interests of efficiency and order 
in the system before the opportunities for laymen to play a 
part in the process are reduced . 
] 
] 
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VI CONCLUSION 
It is coucluded tlwt judicial officers of the District 
Courts have very wide, although not unlimited, discretion to 
control representation a nd assista nce of p~rties in their courts. 
h recent High Court judgment has suggested tLat even the com.'11on lav.' 
"right" to an adviser in Court may be subject to judicial discretion 
in New Zealand. If that is so, then the 011ly limita.tions on the 
discretion are statutory. 
Statutes confer on both parties a right of representation 
by a qualified lawyer which is not subject to discretion. The 
appearance of lay advocates for the complainant in sununary 
proceedings is expressly restricted to police officers and officers 
of particular bodies . However , it is concluded that some discretion 
remains in the Courts to hear la.y advocates in other roles. It is 
submitted that the discretion is further limited only by the 
particular provisions of the Law Practitioners Act 1955 which apply 
to actions in Court. In particular , it is submitted that the provjso 
to section 17(2) of that Act, as relied on by Mr Mihal:a , has no effect 
on the discretion . Ne.i ther tl1e historical status of Maori 
agents nor the terms of the statute justify Mr Mihaka ' s claim to 
audience . 
However , .it is submitted that judicial discretion to grant 
audience to lay advocates is limited by section 16 of the Law Pract-
itioners Act 1955 . That section prohibits an unqualified person 
from acting "as a solicitor " in Court . The statute and New Zec1.land 
cases provide no guidance for the Courts on the interpretation of this 
provision. Courts overseas have approa"cl1ed similar problems in 
different ways but the foreign case law suggests factors that may be 
relevant . 
It is concluded that a significant factor in determining 
whether a layman has acted as a solicitor is whether the actions 
in question required legal training and judgment . It is submitted 
that such a test provides adequa~e protection of individuals against 
the prejudicing of their rights by unskilled third parties . It 
protects the interests of the legal profession so far as is 
justified by lav.ryers ' specialised training and discipline . It 
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also safeguards the workings of the legal system from disruption 
by laymen who are ignorant of its technical requirements. At the 
same time, the use of such a test would not exclude laymen entirely 
from participation in the legal proc0ss. 
Of the other factors considered, the elem ·11t of pretending 
to be a solicitor would seem to constitute a separate offence \\'hich 
is already provided for by statute. Acting for reward and repeated 
actions would be aggravating elements. Their presence would not 
be sufficient to constitute an offence if the primary test were not 
satisfied. 
When applying the test to actions in the District Courts , it 
seems desirable to impose a minimum restriction on judicial dis-
cretion . Judges should be encouraged to allow lay appearances. 
It is submitted that the nctions of a lawyer in the District Courts 
should be defined as being the examination of witnesses and the 
making of submissjoris on points of law . Addresses to judicial 
officers by lay "apologists" on matters relating to the alleged 
offence should be permitted under the present law . 
I t may be necessary to introduce trained lay "criminal 
advocates " to remedy the present undersupply of legal services 
in the Di.strict Courts. The actions of such paraprofessionals would 
be indistinguishable from those of lawyers . They would undoubtedly 
constitute "acting as a solicit.or" and would need specific statutory 
authorisation such as is provided for police proseculions at present. 
Mr Mihaka seems to have regarded the Maori agent as having rigl1ts 
equivalent to those necessary for such advocates. It is submitted 
that under the present law the Justices of the Peace had no disc1etion 
to allow him to examine witnesses . They might , ho~ever , have 
permitted him to address them after the depositions had been taken . 
This conclusion contrasts,with respect, with both the view of the 
Chief District Court Judge , who said that laymen should not be 
permitted to address the Court at all , and the view of Hardie Boys J . 
who thought that the Justices of the Peace had nearly complete 
discretion as to audience. 
] 
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Appendix 1 Background to ~ihaka v\ Police ~---------
This Appendix is based on an intervie·t.' with Mr Viihakc1 . It 
describes the ideas v:hich prompted him to take the stand that he did. 
lt also describes so1Pe of the events wl1ich lecl up to the reported case. 
I should like to thank him for his help. 
Mr Mihaka ' s researches into the history of Maori land dealings 
have led him to identify the historical Maori agent with officers of 
che Land Purchase Department as well is with lay advocates in the Maori 
Land Court . He cites the case of Nireaha Tamaki v . Bakerl69 as showing 
the extensive powers of such officers. In that case , the Court of 
Appeal sc1id that the mere assertion of the claim of the Crown [by the 
Commissioner of Crown Lands] is in itself sufficient to oust the 
jurisdiction of lhis or any other Court in the Colony'' . 170 Mr Mihaka 
does not regard the subsequent reversal of that decision by the Privy 
Councill71 as affecting the valjdity of his view. He points to 
appearances by the Commissioner before the Maori Land Court and Parliament-
ary Committees as showing that such Native a9ents had extensive rights of 
advocacy . 
Emphasis is placed on the uncertainty of the legal status of the 
Maori agent. Mr Mihaka maintains that since there has been no stat.ulory 
redefinition of the term , both meanings survive . In particular , the 
Maori agent still l1as extensive rights of advocacy , extending beyond the 
Maori Land Court and even beyond the Dislrict Courts. Mr Mihaka uses 
the proviso to section 17(7) of the Law Practitioners Act 1955 in support 
of this contention . In i nlerpreting that provision , .section 5 (j) of the 
Acts Interpretation Act 1924 s~ould be applied to give a ''fair large and 
l ib8ral construct.ion and interpretation " of the term "Maori agent " . 
He believes that his claims of a right of audience were refused because 
j udges and lawyers are unwilling to break the lawyers ' monoi:oly in the 
Courts . He had expecled that unwillingness but believ8d his claim 
t o be valid . 
The proceedings which led to Mihaka v . Police were not the first at 
which lie l1ud sought audience . Tl1e episode was part of a campaign to 
open the Courts to people other than lawyers. On the first occasion , 
he had asked if the police were intending to bring charges against some 
Maoris who had been held in custody over the weekend . lie said th<lt he 
would like to speak to them as a Maori agent . The District Court Judge 
did not object to.his addressing the Court in lh~s way and referred his 
i nquiry to the police . The second occasion was in the Wellington District 
Court when he asked a judge for crn~ensation for a young man who had been 
remanded in custody several tiges before the police finally withdrew 
all charges . The judge refused to recognise him in the role of Maori 
agent but allowed him to speak as a friend in Court - although addressing 
t he Court is strictly outside the functions of a McKenzie friend . 
The next two attempts received less co-operation from the Courts . 
In Auckland , the judge refused to let him speak and ordered his removal . 
Mr Mihaka was finally arrested and charged with using obscene language 
and resisting arrest.172 In Christ~hurch , the judge also refused to 
cont ... 
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l1ear him . He apparently orderC!d the police to hold Mr Mihaka 
i n custody until the end of the Court session . 
l n his judgment , Hardie Boys J . refers to Mr Nil1aka ' s inviting 
arrest for contempt of court.173 His Honour assumed thvt Mr Mihaka 
was referring to section 206 oft.he Summary Proceedings Act 1957 . 
Ilowever~ it seems that Mr Mihaka was inviting arrest for acting as 
a solicitor in the Court. That is a contempt. of court under section 
16 ( 2) of the Law Pract.i tioners l,c t 1955 . His Honour says i, 1 the 
same passage that a ''police officer somewhat indelicately indicated 
t he reason for the choice of charge ••. 174 Apparently the off i cer 
thought t hat it might "prick " Mr Mihaka ' s ego . 
J 
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Appendix 2: Some Maori /\gc1ts since 1945 
The following ii a list of people who , I am informed , have 
operated a.s 1,;aori agent;; since 1945 . It is by no means exhaustive. 
Those known to be deceased have been indicated D. 
Foxton: 
Gisborne : 
Hamilton: 
Mrs May Hc1ec1ta 
Mr James Ferris (D) , Mr Erucru Hooper (D) , Mr 
Mafeking Pere (D) , Mr Monty Searancke . 
Mr Ian Bell , Mr Mat Findlay (D) , Mr Ronald Graham(D) , 
Mr William Mciver , Mr Norman Palmer , Mr Robin Ray. 
Hawera : Mr Waipaina Aw~rau (D) , Mr Michael Rotohiko Jones (D) , 
Mr Pei Tehurinui Jones (D) , Mr Harper Takarangi . 
Northland : Mr Louis Parore . 
Opotiki and 
Gisborne : Mr Wiremu Nikora . 
Rotorua : Mr Bertram Kingi , Mr Riini Paraire , Mr Tahi Tait . 
Tc1uranga : Mr Solomon Kanapu , Mr Peihiriri Rewiti , Mr Timothy 
Smith (D ). 
Te Kui t i : Mr Gv.bricll Elliott (D) , Mr Dick Ormsby(D) . 
Ta l aga Bay: James Marino . 
Wairoa : Mr Ra BartJett (D) , Mr Syd Carroll (D), Mr Wi 
Kaipuke , Mr Dick McGregor (D). 
I 
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This case involved an application by two people for permission 
to have McKenzie friends at i1 forthcoming High Court trial. They 
were charged wJ th t\-1elve others with riotous destruct:ion of a motor 
vehicle during protests at tl1e time of the third rugby test between 
New Zealand and South Africa. 'l'he remainj ng defendants had been 
granted legal aid and were to be represented by three counsel. 
Sinclair J . had asked the tv:o applicants to file an inforrr.al 
applicc).tion giving the names of the proposed advisers and their 
qualifications. Hogc111 provided a list of seven women who were 
prepared to "roster" their time to assist !1er. Their qualifications 
were that tl1ey were also young Maori women. Pene named only one 
person. His Honour ccmmented that all of t)1e eight persons named 
were known to the Courts , usually in the role of defendant in a police 
prosecution. 
Before giving his reasons for declining the application , Ilis 
Honour said that he was prepared to consider a grant of legal aid 
if the applicants should change their mind and apply for it. Ii.is 
!Ionour then said that no New Zealand decision has considered the 
i ssue of whether or not a McKenzie friend is available to people 
appearing before the Courts in the same situation as the applicants . 
His Honour considered that McKenzie v. McKenzie 176 must be viewed 
with close regard to the facts of-:Che case , the nationality of those 
involved and the jssues which were involved . Collier v. Hicksl77 -----· ought also to be regarded in the light of its facts and the contrast 
between conditions in 1831 and those in the present day . 
His Honour then said that on his readjng of the deposit.ions , 
th e facts of the forthcoming case were not involved and that the 
questions of law would not be complex . The applicants would be 
r epresented by counsel , on legal aid if necessary . But the trial 
was not of a sort where McKenzie friends ought to be available . 
If al l fourteen accused sought to have advisers then there would be 
t wenty-eight people sitting in the body of the Court taking part in 
proceedings. The presence of a McKenzie friend would ''inevitably 
lead to a deterioration in the manner in wl1ich the trial could be 
178 conducted and indeed the whole proceedings could be rendered chaotic." 
Having regard to the persons put forward us advisers c1n abuse of tl10 
Court's procedures was almost inevitable . 
His Honour then referred to a passage from the judgment of 
the Court of l\.ppeal of New South Wales in _Re B~ 79 'I'hat case 
invo lved an appeal from a decision refusing a person admission as a 
barrister. The appellant had been involved as a McKenzie friend 
in some trials . Moffit P . commented that that device Kas "applied 
h ere as a technique in criminal cases usually on the trial of hardened 
criminals where the accused would appear to defend himself with the 
advantages of that course '' l80 but with an adviser . The adviser would 
no responsibjlity for any impropriety and was not subject to control 
or criticism . The procedure had come to be seen as an abuse of t he 
Court ' s procedures and had been stopped . 
Sinclair J. said that those comments were applicable to the 
experiences of the Courts in New Zealand with McKenzie friends . The 
procedure should not be encouraged or even allowed . 
cont ... 
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It is not c] car what relevance Uw straightforward nature 
of the case had to the decision of Sinclair J . It might almost, 
be inferred thrit tl1e appJj_c2nts would not need any legal help. 
That inference would contrast with the v:ay in which His Honour 
urged the ~pplicants to get counsel , however. It seems unlikely 
that tl1e decision would have been any different if the tria] had 
been complex - if on]y hecause the advisers would not then have 
been of much assistunce. Nor, with respect , does the number of 
people h'lio would need to be accorruTtodated in Court seem particu1 arly 
re]evant. Exactly the same situation would arise if all the 
accused wished to have their own cow1sel. 
It seems clear that the main objection to McKenzie friends 
was to the type of person who acted as adviser and to their likely 
behaviour in Court. His Hotiour might have taken a different 
attitude if the applicants had named lawyers as adviser~ for 
instance. It is difficult to comment on His Honour ' s u.ttitude 
without knowing more about the experiences of the Courts with 
McKenzie friends . However , assuming that the availability of 
advisers is a matter for the discretion of a judge , it is submitted 
that a blanket ban on McKenzie friends is undesirable. Individual 
situations should be dealt with on tl:eir facts. 
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